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Abstract
It is often difficult for a phased mission system (PMS) to be highly
reliable, because this entails achieving high reliability in every phase
of operation. Consequently, reliability analysis of such systems is
of critical importance. However, efficient and interpretable analysis
of PMSs enabling general component lifetime distributions, arbitrary
structures, and the possibility that components skip phases has been
an open problem.
In this paper, we show that the survival signature can be used for
reliability analysis of PMSs with similar types of component in each
phase, providing an alternative to the existing limited approaches in
the literature. We then develop new methodology addressing the full
range of challenges above. The new method retains the attractive
survival signature property of separating the system structure from
the component lifetime distributions, simplifying computation, insight
into, and inference for system reliability.
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1 Introduction
A phased mission system (PMS) is one that performs several different tasks
or functions in sequence. The periods in which each of these successive tasks
or functions takes place are known as phases [1, 2]. Examples of PMSs
can be found in many practical applications, such as electric power systems,
aerospace systems, weapon systems and computer systems. A typical exam-
ple of a PMS is the monitoring system in a satellite-launching mission with
three phases: launch, separation, and orbiting.
A PMS is considered to be functioning if all of its phases are completed
without failure, and failed if failure occurs in any phase. Therefore, the relia-
bility of a PMS with N phases is the probability that it operates successfully
in all of its phases:
RS = P(Phase 1 works ∩ Phase 2 works ∩ · · · ∩ Phase N works) (1)
The calculation of the reliability of a PMS is more complex than that
of a single phase system, because the structure of the system varies between
phases and the component failures in different phases are mutually dependent
[1].
Over the past few decades, there have been extensive research efforts
to analyze PMS reliability. Generally, there are two classes of models to
address such scenarios: state space oriented models [3, 4, 5, 6] and combina-
torial methods [7, 8, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. The main idea of state space
oriented models is to construct Markov chains and/or Petri nets to represent
the system behaviour, since these provide flexible and powerful options for
modelling complex dependencies among system components. However, the
cardinality of the state space can become exponentially large as the number
of components increases. The remaining approaches exploit combinatorial
methods, Boolean algebra and various forms of decision diagrams for relia-
bility analysis of PMSs.
In particular, in recent years the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) — a
combinatorial method — has become more widely used in reliability analysis
of PMSs due to its computationally efficient and compact representation of
the structure function compared with other methods. Zang et al. [9] first
used the BDD method to analyze the reliability of PMSs. Tang et al. [10]
developed a new BDD-based algorithm for reliability analysis of PMSs with
multimode failures. Mo [11] and Reed et al. [12] improved the efficiency of
Tang’s method by proposing a heuristic selection strategy and reducing the
BDD size, respectively. Xing et al. [13, 14] and Levitin et al. [15] proposed
BDD based methods for the reliability evaluation of PMSs with common-
cause failures and propagated failures. Wang et al. [16] and Lu et al. [17]
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Figure 1: A PMS with similar components in each phase.
studied modular methods for reliability analysis of PMSs with repairable
components, by combining BDDs with state-enumeration methods.
While the BDD method has been shown to be a very efficient combinato-
rial method, it is still difficult to analyze large systems without considerable
computational expense [1, 12]. In this paper, we propose a combinatorial
analytical approach providing a new survival signature methodology for reli-
ability analysis of PMSs. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives
a brief background on PMSs; section 3 first shows how the standard sur-
vival signature can be used to evaluate PMSs with similar component types
in each phase, before providing a novel methodology which facilitates het-
erogeneity of components across the phases. Section 4 presents illustrative
examples showing numerical agreement with existing literature, but where
the full benefits of the interpretability of survival signatures is now available
due to this work. Finally, section 5 presents some conclusions ideas for future
work.
2 Phased mission systems
Figure 1 shows a simple system that performs a series of functions or tasks
which are carried out over consecutive periods of time to achieve a certain
overall goal (or ‘mission’). Such a system — where the structure (and pos-
sibly operating environment) of the system changes over time — is known
as a Phased Mission System (PMS), with each period of operation being
referred to as a ‘phase’. Each phase therefore corresponds to one structural
configuration and components in different phases are taken to be mutually
dependent.
Let us consider a system consisting of N ≥ 2 phases, with ni compo-
nents in phase i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The binary state indicator variable Xij, j ∈
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{1, . . . , ni} denotes the operational status of the jth component in phase i:
Xij =
{
1 if component j works for all of phase i
0 if component j fails before the end of phase i
The vectors Xi = (Xi1, . . . , Xini), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, represent the states of
all components in the ith phase and the full vector X = (X1, . . . ,XN) =
(X11, . . . , X1n1 , . . . , XN1, . . . , XNnN ) represents the states of all components
during the full mission.
The state of the system in each phase is also a binary random variable,
which is completely determined by the states of the components in that
phase. Let φi represent the system state in the ith phase, that is:
φi = ϕi(Xi) = ϕi(Xi1, . . . , Xini)
where ϕi(·) is the structure function of the system design in phase i. The
structure function evaluates to φi = 1 if the system functions for state vector
Xi, and φi = 0 if not.
Similarly, the structure function of the full PMS (that is, the operational
state of the system across all phases) is also a binary random variable, which
is completely determined by the states of all the components in the PMS
φS = ϕS(X) ,
N∏
i=1
ϕi(Xi1, . . . , Xini) (2)
The structure function as shown in eq. (2) is again a Boolean function
which is derived from the truth table of the structure functions for each phase
of operation. The truth tables depend uniquely on the system configurations
and simply provide a means of tabulating all the possible combinational
states of each component to realise the operational state of the system in
each case. The state vectors for which ϕS(X) = 1 provide a logical expression
for the functioning of the system, while the states when ϕS(X) = 0 provide
a logical expression for the failure of the system. It should be noted that,
unlike non-PMSs, there exist impossible combinations of states which should
be deleted from the truth table when performing a reliability analysis. For
example, if both the system and its components are non-repairable during
the mission, then if a component is failed in a certain phase it cannot be
working in subsequent phases.
Finally, if all phases are completed successfully, the mission is a success,
that is:
φS =
N∏
i=1
φi = 1 ⇐⇒ φi = 1 ∀ i
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3 Survival signature
For larger systems, working with the full structure function can be compli-
cated and as the system size grows it becomes hard to intuit anything mean-
ingful from the particular algebraic form it takes. In particular, one may be
able to summarize the structure function when it consists of exchangeable
components of one or more types [18, 19, 20].
Recently, the concept of the survival signature has attracted substantial
attention, because it provides such a summary which enables insight into
the system design even for large numbers of components of differing types.
Coolen and Coolen-Maturi [19] first introduced the survival signature, us-
ing it to analyze complex systems consisting of multiple types of compo-
nent. Subsequently, [20, 21, 22] presented the use of the survival signature in
an inferential setting, with nonparametric predictive inference and Bayesian
posterior predictive inference respectively, and [23] presented methods for
analyzing imprecise system reliability using the survival signature. Patelli et
al. [24] developed a survival signature-based simulation method to calculate
the reliability of large and complex systems and [25] presents a simulation
method which can be used if the dependency structure is too complex for
a survival signature approach. Walter et al. [26] proposed a new condition-
based maintenance policy for complex systems using the survival signature.
Moreover, Eryilmaz et al. [27] generalized the survival signature to multi-
state systems.
Efficient computation of the survival signature was addressed by Reed
[28], using reduced order binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs). The survival
signature of a system can be easily computed by specifying the reliability
block diagram as a simple graph by using the ReliabilityTheory R package
[29].
In this section, the survival signature is first shown to apply directly to
full mission-length PMSs where there is a single component type in each
phase. Thereafter, an extension is presented which enables heterogeneity of
component types across phases, providing novel methodology for reliability
analysis of PMSs.
3.1 PMSs with similar components in each phase
We consider a system with N ≥ 2 phases, with n components in each phase
(e.g. the PMS as shown in fig. 1), and let phase i ∈ {1, . . . , N} run from time
τi to time τi+1 with τ1 , 0 and τi < τi+1 ∀ i. Thus the full mission time is
denoted τN+1.
We assume that the random failure times of components in the same
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phase are fully independent, and in addition that the components are ex-
changeable. Let Φ(l1, . . . , lN) denote the probability that the PMS functions
by the end of the mission given that precisely li, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, of its com-
ponents functioned in phase i. Both the system and its components are
non-repairable during the mission, so n ≥ l1 ≥ l2 ≥ · · · ≥ lN ≥ 0 and the
number of components that function at the beginning of phase i is mi = li−1,
with m1 = n — so all components appear in all phases. Subject to these
constraints which do not apply in a non-PMS, the survival signature can then
be applied without further modification for the mission completion time.
There are
(
mi
li
)
state vectors where precisely li components function. Be-
cause the random failure times of components in the same phase are inde-
pendent and exchangeable, the survival signature is equal to:
Φ(l1, . . . , lN) =
[
N∏
i=1
(
mi
li
)−1]∑
X∈S
ϕS(X) (3)
where S denotes the set of all possible state vectors for the whole system
where li components in phase i are functioning. This step is of the same
form as the standard survival signature for a static system [19], but note one
immediate subtle difference: as noted above, mi is not fixed across evalua-
tions of Φ(·), but rather is determined by li−1, since the maximum number
of functioning components in the ith phase is determined by how many com-
ponents completed phase i− 1 still functioning.
A further subtlety arises as soon as we consider any time leading up to
the mission completion time, because the structure of the system changes.
Although the standard survival signature can be used in computing the relia-
bility of a static system at any point in its life [19], this is no longer true in this
extension to PMSs. Consequently, (3) is the survival signature which repre-
sents the probability that the whole mission completes successfully given that
li components are working in phase i. For the survival function of a PMS,
we must extend the survival signature to create a family of survival signa-
tures which account for the temporally changing structure. Let Φp(l1, . . . , lp)
denote the survival signature of a PMS up to and including phase p ≤ N ,
which is the probability that the mission has not yet failed by phase p given
that li components are working in phase i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Then,
Φp(l1, . . . , lp) =
[
p∏
i=1
(
mi
li
)−1]∑
X∈S
p∏
i=1
ϕi(X) (4)
We define a function mapping mission time t to the current phase
ρ(t) : [0, τN+1]→ {1, . . . , N}, as ρ(t) , max{i : τi < t} (5)
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From eq. (1) and (4), the reliability of the PMS at time t can then be
expressed pointwise as:
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mρ(t)∑
lρ(t)=0
Φρ(t)(l1, . . . , lρ(t))P
ρ(t)⋂
i=1
{Ci(t) = li}
 (6)
where Ci(t) is the random variable denoting the number of components in
phase i which function at time t ∈ [τi, τi+1). If R(t) is being evaluated at
t ≥ τi+1 then Ci(t) , Ci(τi+1). By the definition of ρ(t), R(t) will never be
evaluated for t < τi.
Because components are of the same type they share a common lifetime
distribution as long as they all appear in all phases (and hence age together).
As a result, the sequential nature of a PMS means that components in the
same phase have common conditional CDF, Fi(t), for phase i, where condi-
tioning is on the component having worked at the beginning of phase i. That
is, if the components have common CDF F (t) and all components appear in
every phase (in possibly different configurations), then the conditional CDF
in phase i is:
Fi(t) = P(T < t | τi, τi+1, T > τi)
=
1
1− F (τi)
∫ min{t,τi+1}
τi
dF (z)
=
F (min{t, τi+1})− F (τi)
1− F (τi) (7)
where τi is the start time of phase i (τ1 , 0) and T is the random variable
representing component lifetime.
Proceeding with this conditional CDF, the last term in eq. (6) can be
simplified as
P
ρ(t)⋂
i=1
{Ci(t) = li}
 = ρ(t)∏
i=1
P (Ci(t) = li)
=
ρ(t)∏
i=1
[(
mi
li
)
(Ri(t))
li(1−Ri(t))mi−li
]
where
Ri(t) = 1− Fi(t) = 1− F (min{t, τi+1})
1− F (τi) (8)
is the reliability of the components at time t in phase i.
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Thus, eq. (6) can be rewritten pointwise in t as
R(t) =
m1∑
l1=0
· · ·
mρ(t)∑
lρ(t)=0
Φρ(t)(l1, . . . , lρ(t))
×
ρ(t)∏
i=1
[(
mi
li
)
(Ri(t))
li(1−Ri(t))mi−li
] (9)
Since in the general case (see special case exception in the sequel) every
component appears in every phase, this can be written
R(t) =
l0∑
l1=0
· · ·
lρ(t)−1∑
lρ(t)=0
Φρ(t)(l1, . . . , lρ(t))
×
ρ(t)∏
i=1
[(
li−1
li
)
(Ri(t))
li(1−Ri(t))li−1−li
] (10)
where we define l0 , n. Writing in this final form stresses the sequential
dependence in the computation, in stark contrast to the standard survival
signature for a static system.
3.1.1 Special case: Exponentially distributed component lifetime
There are two simplifications that arise when components are Exponentially
distributed. Firstly, Fi(t) ≡ F (t) ∀ i, so that Ri(t) = R(t) = 1−F (t− τi) ∀i.
The second simplification is that not all components need to appear in
all phases. It may be that some components appear only in later phases (but
continue to appear after the first phase they are in). In this case, one should
be careful not to use (10), but instead (9) where now mi = li−1 + m?i where
m?i is the number of components appearing in the system for the first time
at phase i.
3.1.2 Modelling constraints
Note that considerable care is required in the specification of — and implicit
assumptions made for — Fi(t). In particular, when a component is not
present in a phase, then whether ageing continues (i.e. time passes) or not
is crucial in determining whether the assumption of identical component
lifetime distribution still holds in all phases. For example, in fig. 1 each
component appears in all phases and therefore experiences the same wear,
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Figure 2: A PMS with multiple types of components.
but in fig. 2 each component is in precisely 2 of the 3 phases. Consequently,
even though one might assume all components are of the same type initially,
if component C is considered not to ‘age’ during phase 1 (where it is not
present) then it will in fact not have identical conditional lifetime distribution
to A and E during phase 2, since the latter will have already experienced
wear from phase 1.
This imposes rather unattractive modelling strictures: all components of
similar type must appear in the same phases; or all components must have
constant failure rate (Exponentially distributed lifetime). These modelling
strictures severely limit applicability to real world systems, thus motivating
the novel methodological extension of survival signatures hereinafter.
3.2 PMSs with different components in different phases
Most practical PMSs for which the reliability is modelled consist of heteroge-
neous component types both within and between phases. Therefore, a more
interesting challenge is to extend the methodology of survival signatures to
this more general setting.
We now consider this setting in generality and show that the problem
again simplifies in the special case of Exponentially distributed lifetimes,
which is the only case that most of the literature has addressed to date. The
only constraint we impose is that components of the same type appear in
the same phases (since then the conditional CDFs within phases remain in
agreement). However, note that this does not limit the scenarios that can be
modelled, since components of the same physical type can still be split into
multiple ‘meta-types’.
Definition 3.1. (Meta-type) Components are defined to be of the same
meta-type when they are of the same physical type and appear in the same
phases.
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Let there be a total of K different meta-types of component. We take
the multi-type, multi-phase survival signature to be denoted by the function
Φ(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lN1, . . . , lNK), the probability that the system functions
given that precisely lik, components of type k function in phase i. That is,
Φ(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lN1, . . . , lNK) =
[
N∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
(
mik
lik
)−1]∑
X∈S
ϕS(X)
where S denotes the set of all possible state vectors for the whole system.
Not all component types need necessarily appear in all phases, so we admit
the possibility that mik = 0 when a component type is absent from a phase
and observe the standard definition that
(
0
0
)
, 1 — this simplifies notation
versus having varying numbers of li· for each phase.
As before, the above survival signature is only applicable to the full mis-
sion time and we define a family of survival signatures corresponding the
successive phases of the mission. Let Φp(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lp1, . . . , lpK) denote
the survival signature of a PMS up to and including phase p ≤ N , which is
the probability that the mission has not yet failed by phase p given that lik
components of type k are working in phase i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Then,
Φp(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lp1, . . . , lpK) =
[
p∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
(
mik
lik
)−1]∑
X∈S
p∏
i=1
ϕi(X) (11)
We retain the definition of ρ(t) given in (5). It then follows from eq. (1)
and eq. (11) that the reliability of the PMS can be characterised as:
R(t) =
m11∑
l11=0
· · ·
mρ(t),K∑
lρ(t),K=0
[
Φρ(t)(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lρ(t),1, . . . , lρ(t),K)
×P
ρ(t)⋂
i=1
K⋂
k=1
{Cik(t) = lik}
 (12)
where Cik(t) is the random variable denoting the number of components of
type k in phase i which function at time t ∈ [τi, τi+1). In the same vein as
section 3.1, if R(t) is being evaluated at t ≥ τi+1 then Cik(t) , Cik(τi+1). By
the definition of ρ(t), R(t) will never be evaluated for t < τi.
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We can simplify, by defining that P (Cik(t) = 0) = 1 when mik = 0.
P
ρ(t)⋂
i=1
K⋂
k=1
{Cik(t) = lik}
 = ρ(t)∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
P (Cik(t) = lik)
=
ρ(t)∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
[(
mik
lik
)
(Rik(t))
lik(1−Rik(t))mik−lik
]
with
Rik(t) =
1− Fk(min{t, τi+1})
1− Fk(τi) (13)
where Fk(·) is the CDF of the component lifetime distribution for the meta-
type k.
Consequently, for any time t during the mission, we have the reliability
of the system characterised by:
R(t) =
m11∑
l11=0
· · ·
mρ(t),K∑
lρ(t),K=0
Φρ(t)(l11, . . . , l1K , . . . , lρ(t),1, . . . , lρ(t),K)
×
ρ(t)∏
i=1
K∏
k=1
[(
mik
lik
)
(Rik(t))
lik(1−Rik(t))mik−lik
] (14)
where mik = ljk for j = max{j : j < i,mjk > 0}. That is, mik is the number
components which were working in the most recent preceding phase where
this component meta-type appears.
3.2.1 Special case: Exponential component lifetimes
Exponentially distributed component lifetimes again provide simplifications.
Now, the Rik(t) ≡ Rk(t) due to the memoryless property of the Exponential
distribution.
Furthermore, we can relax the definition of a meta-type of component.
The definition of component meta-types serves two purposes: (i) to ensure
that mik can be determined without tracking the individual functioning sta-
tus of all components; and (ii) to ensure that the conditional CDFs of all
components of the same meta-type in a phase are the same. The second
purpose is made entirely redundant by the memoryless nature of the Expo-
nential distribution. The first purpose remains, but can be achieved with a
weaker definition of meta-type.
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Definition 3.2. (Exponential meta-type) Components are defined to be of
the same exponential meta-type when they are of the same Exponentially
distributed physical type, and if once any pair of components of the same
exponential meta-type appear in a phase together, they both appear in all
subsequent phases where either component appears.
In other words, components of the same exponential meta-type may
first appear in the system at different phases, but thereafter should ap-
pear whenever at least one such exponential meta-type component appears.
This definition enables the determination of mik as mik = ljk + m
?
ik for
j = max{j : j < i,mjk > 0}, where m?ik is the number of components of
exponential meta-type k appearing for the first time in phase i.
The benefits of Exponential component lifetimes can be mixed in a system
containing both meta-type and exponential meta-types since a crucial feature
of survival signatures is the factorisation of such types so that they do not
interact.
4 Numerical examples
4.1 Example 1
We first consider the PMS shown in fig. 1. The duration of each phase is
taken to be 10 hours, and the failure rate of each component in each phase
is 10−4/hour.
The survival signatures of this PMS can be obtained using eq. (3). The
elements of the survival signature which are non-zero are shown in table 1 —
that is, rows where Φ(l1) = 0,Φ(l1, l2) = 0 and Φ(l1, l2, l3) = 0 are omitted.
The table is grouped into a nested sequence of phases, with just the first phase
shown, followed by the first two phases together and finally all phases — this
helps emphasise and clarify the sequential dependence of phases, where mk
depends on lk−1.
We can obtain the conditional reliability of components using the condi-
tional failure rate of the component in each phase. Equation (9) then renders
the reliability of the PMS as a whole. The results are shown in table 2 and
fig. 3. These results concord with those found using an independent method
in [9].
Of note is the jump discontinuity in the reliability function at t = 20, as
shown in fig. 3. This occurs because a failure of component A during phase
2 does not necessarily cause failure of the system at that point, so long as at
least one of components B or C work. However, in this situation the PMS
will fail instantaneously upon commencing phase 3 at t = 20+. Consequently,
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First phase Phase 1+2 All Phases
0 ≤ t ≤ 10 10 < t ≤ 20 20 < t ≤ 30
l1 Φ(l1) l1 l2 Φ(l1, l2) l1 l2 l3 Φ(l1, l2, l3)
3 1 3 1 1 3 2 2 2
3
3 2 1 3 3 2 2
3
3 3 1 3 3 3 1
Table 1: Survival signature of the PMS shown in fig. 1
t 0 10− 10+ 20− 20+ 30
R 1 0.99700 0.997700 0.997700 0.99601 0.99501
Table 2: Reliability of the PMS in example 1
the size of the jump discontinuity in fact corresponds to the probability of
the event {A fails in phase 2, but the system still functions}.
4.2 Example 2
For the PMS shown in fig. 2, phases 1, 2 and 3 last for 10, 90 and 100 hours
respectively. All components in each phase are of the same type and the
lifetime distribution of these components follows a two-parameter Weibull
distribution. Table 3 summarises the distribution information of the compo-
nents in each phase.
As described in section 3.2, if some components of the same type appear
in a phase and also appear in some subsequent phases — but not simulta-
neously — then these components should be considered as different types
of component. For this example, this means that despite the fact they all
share a common failure rate within phases, components A and E need to be
labelled as type 1 and the remainder as type 2, because ageing will have been
different.
Parameter Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Scale 250 1000 300
Shape 2.6 3.2 2.6
Table 3: Conditional distribution information of the components in each
phase
13
Figure 3: Reliability of the PMS in example 1.
The survival signatures of this PMS are shown in table 4, with rows where
Φ(l11, l12) = 0,Φ(l11, l12, l21, l22) = 0 and Φ(l11, l12, l21, l22, l32) = 0 suppressed.
The reliability of the PMS is shown in table 5 and fig. 4.
We again see a jump discontinuity in the reliability curve depicted in
fig. 4, at t = 10. In this instance, if component E fails during phase 1 the
system will still function, but instantaneous failure will occur once phase 2
commences. This is evident in table 5, which shows the jump discontinuity
is of size 2.3 × 10−4. Indeed, this should correspond to the probability that
the system survives phase 1 but with component E failing during that phase.
That is:
P(A,B function ∩ E fails in phase 1)
= P(E fails in phase 1)P(A,B function |E fails in phase 1)
=
∫ 10
0
ba−btb−1e−(t/a)
b
dt
(
1−
∫ 10
0
ba−btb−1e−(t/a)
b
dt
)2
≈ 2.3× 10−4 for a = 250, b = 2.6
as required. Hence, PMS can exhibit jump discontinuities where probability
mass from non-critical failures in one phase accumulate onto phase change
boundaries when the system layout switches.
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The first phase The first two phases All phases
l11 l12 Φ1 l11 l12 l21 l22 Φ12 l11 l12 l21 l22 l32 ΦS
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 1 1/2
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1 2 1/2
2 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 1/2
2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1/2
2 1 1 1 2 1/2
2 1 1 1 3 1/2
2 1 2 0 1 1
2 1 2 0 2 1
2 1 2 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 3 1
Table 4: Survival signature of the PMS shown in fig. 2
Figure 4: Reliability of the PMS in example 2.
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t 0 10− 10+ 100− 100+ 200
R 1 0.999768 0.999536 0.999086 0.999086 0.998910
Table 5: Reliability of the PMS in example 2.
	
Phase 1 Phase 2
Ha
Hc
Hd
Hb
3/4
Lb
La
Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Hb
Ha
Ha
Hc
Hd
Hb
3/4
Ab
Aa
Hb
Ha
Ha
Hc
Hd
Hb
3/4
Cb
Ca
Figure 5: Reliability block diagram of the space application.
4.3 Example 3
In this final example, we replicate the space application mission discussed by
Zang [9] and Mural [30]. This example includes the full complexity of real-
world PMSs, where there is now heterogeneity of component types within
phases. This means that multiple component types arise necessarily and not
merely as a side effect of identical components appearing in differing phases.
There are five phases involved in this space mission: launch is the first phase,
followed by Hibern.1, Asteroid, Hibern.2, and finally Comet. The reliability
block diagram is shown in fig. 5. The five phases last for 48, 17520, 672,
26952 and 672 hours, respectively. The failure rates of the components in
each phase are given in table 6.
As shown in table 7, in order to calculate the reliability of the PMS,
the 4 ‘real’ component types must be divided into 5 types when using the
Phase1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
Ha, Hb, Hc, Hd 10
−5 10−6 10−5 10−6 10−5
La, Lb 5× 10−5 0 0 0 0
Aa, Ab 0 0 10
−5 0 0
Ca, Cb 0 0 0 0 10
−4
Table 6: Failure rates of the components.
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Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Ha, Hb Hc, Hd La, Lb Aa, Ab Ca, Cb
Table 7: Types of components in example 3.
t 0 48− 48+ 17568− 17568+ 18240− 18240+ 45192− 45192+ 45864
R 1 0.99999 0.99999 0.99968 0.99964 0.99862 0.99862 0.99670 0.99600 0.98943
Table 8: Reliability of the PMS in example 3.
methodology presented in this paper. That is, although Ha, Hb, Hc, and Hd
have homogeneous failure rates throughout all phases, because they do not
always appear together they will exhibit different ageing. Consequently, these
are split into two ‘pseudo’ types.
The result of analysing the reliability of this PMS is shown in table 8 and
fig. 6. The results found using the new methodology we have presented in
this paper are in agreement with the entirely independent method in [9].
5 Conclusion
Computing the reliability of a PMS is considerably more complex than that
of a non-PMS, due to the variation in system structure between phases and
the dependencies between component failures in different phases. Conse-
quently, reliability analysis of PMSs has become one of the most challenging
topics in the field of system reliability evaluation and maintenance engineer-
ing in recent decades. Despite some progress towards efficient and effective
methods for measuring the reliability of PMS, it is still difficult to analyze
large systems without considerable computational expense and even where
it is possible, many methods fail to convey intuition about the reliability of
the system.
In this paper, a new and efficient method for reliability analysis of PMS
is proposed using survival signature. Signatures have been proven to be an
efficient method for estimating the reliability of systems. A new kind of
survival signature is derived to represent the structure function of the PMS.
Then the proposed survival signature is applied to calculate the reliability
of the PMS. Reliability analysis of a system using signatures could separate
the system structure from the component probabilistic failure distribution.
Therefore, the proposed approach is easy to be implemented in practice and
has high computational efficiency.
Note that reliability analysis of PMSs with multiple failure mode compo-
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Figure 6: Reliability of the PMS in example 3, with inset graph providing
blown-up detail of first 200 hours of operation.
nents is not studied in this paper. In practice the components may perhaps
have more than one failure mode. In ongoing work, the authors are con-
sidering component importance analysis, extending work such as [23, 31] to
PMSs.
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